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The apparent cleverness of the title of Professor Kanowitz's book,
Poem is a Four-Letter Word, tends to detract from its significance.
Uncleverly-but with calculation-the title suggests that the filth of a
four-letter word inheres not in the word but in the reader. While that
conclusion has often been reached by thoughtful students of literature, as well as by many of the little gentlemen who explicate poetry,
it has not been expressly recognized by the courts. The public, of
course, is beyond reproach.
Poem is a book about a controversy which raged in the State of
New Mexico during the Spring months of 1969-through "controversy" is perhaps inaccurate: It was a religious war of sorts and as
such tacitly continues. It happened that a Freshman English instructor used a presumably dirty poem (Lenore Kandel's "Love Lust,"
which, inter alia, praises the timely combination of cunnilingus and
felatio) in his class, in an effort, presumably, to explore the question
of "whether an intimate expression of desire would be wrong in the
sense that communicating it (would) cause evil in the community."
As a visiting lecturer in the same class, another graduate assistant
discussed homosexuality and hypocrisy, reading from a suspicious
article with a rather remarkable title. A Vietnam veteran (it turned
out he wasn't a Nam veteran, but it is interesting to note that the
news media made him one in an unbiased effort to illuminate his
self-righteousness) was apparently upset by the poem and the visiting
lecturer's discussion, as too was the father of a young and blossoming
student. The veteran, a timely hero, and the father, a self-declared
champion of perpetual innocence, made prompt reports to the news
media and the President of the University.
On the same day that the "Love Lust" scandal hit the news, the
New Mexico House of Representatives adopted a memorial directing
the Regents of the University of New Mexico to fire the instructor
who introduced the poem. The sponsors of the memorial tried to
include a provision calling for a special legislative session to reduce
the University appropriations to $1.00 if the Regents didn't do as
ordered, but in a brief moment of sobriety the House failed to approve the provision. The President, though, immediately suspended
both instructors, and the religious war was under way.
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The local newspaper monopoly added fuel to the fire, as did other
objective reporters in the media. There were hundreds of letters-tothe-editor, a few marches and speeches, strikes and threatened
strikes, television editorials, ad hoc meetings of concerned citizens,
crusades, sit-ins, and sundry other expressions of local interest. The
State's political opportunists eagerly jumped on the bandwagon in
order to persuade the public of their own moral integrity; needless to
say, there was considerable debate. Shortly, the state legislature reappropriated $50,000 of higher education money and began investigating the University. And Kanowitz, who earlier had been appointed
academic counsel to the suspended instructors, suddenly found himself in the middle of the Inquisition.
Kanowitz's account of the whole affair is essentially documentary,
but the style is engaging and allows the reader to get involved in the
course of events. More importantly, though, the book provides a
readable and dramatized version of a variety of socio-legal problems
and the'political underpinnings of the legal process in general.
As the fire began to spread, people ran in different directions. The
instructor who had introduced the poem was black and by a short
stretch of the President's white imagination was accused of "verbal
sexual assault." The other instructor was a Jew whose wit and
sarcasm were not necessarily endearing. The issues were couched in
terms of First Amendment rights, procedural due process, the moral
propriety of four-letter words, academic freedom and the unfettered
pursuit of Truth, University autonomy, political reactionism, and, of
course, racism.
The reaction in New Mexico to the "Love Lust" poem was unthinking and sophomoric, though decidedly enthusiastic. It might be
suggested that even those trained in the rigors of legal thinking were
as quixotic as those who, by legal definition, were still reasonable
men (and women). Virtually no one had both feet on the ground. A
letter from five of Professor Kanowitz's Law School colleagues provides a typical example.
The President of the University had summarily suspended the two
instructors on the basis of section 7 of the University's Policy on
Academic Freedom and Tenure, which states that "suspension of a
faculty member ... shall be justified only if harm to himself or
others is threatened by his continuance. . . ." Just after the nasty

events had occurred, a committee had been set up to advise the
President. The President testified at one of the committee's hearings
and introduced the letter from the Law School. At this point in the
hearing, the committee was trying to elicit what threatened harm had
allegedly justified the suspensions. The day before, the committee
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had had an audience with all but four of the students involved. At
that meeting the students not only applauded the performance of
their ex-instructors, but expressed a sense of gratitude few teachers
could imagine.
Now, however, with the question of threatened harm before the
committee, the President was on the stand. The committee members
had pursued a line of questioning which suggested that the President's decision might not have been based on section 7 at all, but
rather on outside pressures emanating from such scattered sources as
the Senate Finance Committee and the publicly expressed opinion of
an Albuquerque dentist. In an effort to keep his foot out of his
mouth, the President introduced the letter.
Disassociating themselves from Kanowitz's position on the controversy, the five Law Faculty signers of the letter mentioned
"standards of propriety which govern all civilized society," and went
on to try, convict, and condemn the suspended instructors. Regarding the question at hand, the letter said, "We believe that you are
justified in interpreting [section 7] to include more than physical
harm;" in other words, unsubstantiated intimidation would do the
trick.
Kanowitz's Law School colleagues weren't content with that,
though. Referring to the State's salubrious sodomy statute (N.M.
Stats. sec 40A-9-6) and the poem-which "appears to relish (these)
acts"-the letter stated that "certainly the state university and its
faculty should not place itself or themselves in a position which
might suggest approbation of such acts to any class of students,
particularly a freshman class of teenagers." Attempting to focus the
issue, the letter concluded:
...

we suggest that perhaps the basic question is one of the proper

content of, and materials for, a University course, and of the extent
to which the regular faculty of each department should be responsible for determining content and materials for supervising teaching
assistants.*
Kanowitz was quick to point out that the use of a particular item
in class hardly "suggest(s) approbation" of its contents, though he
didn't point out that his colleagues knew little about the poem qua
poem. And if they really had any faith in "standards of propriety
which govern all civilized society" and in New Mexico's grand old
*In attempting to come to grips with the one issue, the authors came up with two: 1) the
proper content of a course, and 2) the determination of materials for supervising teaching
assistants. Instead of "for" they meant "while."
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sodomy statute, they had evidently not read, forgotten, or repressed
much of the world's classic literature, which, one might hope, they
had had occasion to read. Departing from the pretended ignorance of
Socrates which is traditionally espoused in our law schools, Kanowitz's colleagues had themselves summarily determined that "Love
Lust" wasn't the classroom's cup of tea.
In the middle of all this, New Mexico's Governor, an attorney, had
said to hell with the instructors: "they'll get their due process later."
While many New Mexicans looked at the University, Kanowitz chose
instead to deal with the controversy's legal entanglements. Accordingly, Chapter 6 is entitled "Obscenity and the Law," and while it,
too, attempts to focus the issues, it does so with refreshing success.
At the outset, though, it should be noted that the style of this
chapter is not unlike that of the other twenty narrative chapters. It
was written for regular folks and has no pretensions of being an
appellate brief, though it deals with some technical aspects of constitutional law.
After reviewing some of the Supreme Court's earlier attempts to
define obscenity, Kanowitz states that "(his) own view is that attempts to compromise the absolute command of the First Amendment as applied to so-called obscenity renders the Amendment meaningless in that area." Maintaining that view, Kanowitz keeps
company with Justices Black and Douglas. But despite the viability
of that conclusion today, it might be suggested that, historically, the
First Amendment had nothing to do with obscenity, but rather was
designed to protect the expression of limited political dissatisfaction.
A similar statement could be made with regard to racial discrimination, though. No historian in his right mind would contend
that the Constitution was not an overtly bigoted document, yet
today it has somehow become the font of equality and justice.
Wisely, Kanowitz makes no historical argument.*
He does point out that the absolute command of the First Amendment is not really absolute, e.g., one doesn't properly yell "Fire!" in
a crowded theatre. While it might be suggested that yelling "Fire!" in
a crowded theatre also has nothing to do with the First Amendment,
Kanowitz notes "that if serious harm can be discerned as emanating
from the fact of speech itself, it may be curbed by the state or
federal governments." The problem, of course, is whether any serious
*The confusion wrought by the Supreme Court in predicating many of its decisions on
the historical significance of the Amendments is often amusing. For instance, the Court has
recounted the historical origin of the Fourth Amendment in roughly 200 cases, never once
admitting that it was prompted by colonial merchants busily engaged in smuggling rum.
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harm can be discerned as emanating from the use of four-letter words
[in particular contexts.]
Drawing from the Court's 1969 decision in Stanley v. Georgia,
Kanowitz points out that the private possession of matter admittedly
obscene is not a crime, nor can its possession be made a crime within
the confines of the Constitution. Mr. Justice Marshall, speaking for
the majority, had said that the defendant "was asserting the right to
read or observe what he pleases-the right to satisfy his intellectual
and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home." After
momentarily treading on the edge of history, Marshall concluded
that "there seems to be little empirical basis for (the) assertion" that
''exposure to obscenity may lead to deviant sexual behavior" or
antisocial conduct. "(M)ere private possession of obscene matter,"
stated the Court, "cannot constitutionally be made a crime."
On the basis of Stanley, Kanowitz decided that there's nothing
wrong with using obscene material in a college classroom, at least as
it was used here, the students having been forewarned that this kind
of material might be examined. He concluded that if, according to
Stanley, a state may not interfere with one's right to acquire knowledge-obscene or otherwise-in the privacy of his home, "then, a
fortiori, the university classroom, whose only reason for existence is
to provide a place for the acquisition of knowledge, should be subject to the same protection." With that conclusion, I disagree: to put
it simply, the reason offered for the existence of the classroom does
not magically mold one's privacy into the matrix of a larger arena.
In support of his conclusion, Kanowitz quotes from Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, a non-obscenity
case, which stated that:
in our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism.... students may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate.
They may not be confined to the expressions of those sentiments
that are officially approved.
While this (and other) language in the Tinker decision lends itself to a
preclusion of state interference, the Court in Stanley was concerned
with the expression of an unusual kind of knowledge, and the Court
predicated its imprimatur on the private acquisition of that knowledge. In getting from the absolute privacy of one's home to the
classroom, Kanowitz asserts that the underlying rationale of the
Stanley opinion was the "inviolability of the right to acquire knowledge." In doing so, I think, he leaves behind the Court's stamp of
approval.
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My basic disagreement with Kanowitz's conclusion, though, is that
it departs from the suggestion of the book's title, and he appears to
be satisfied-as was the majority in the Stanley decision-that old
Stanley really was (in his case) watching dirty movies. The Stanley
decision, in effect, avoids the issue of obscenity by saying that
people can do what they want when they're alone. Lord knows, we
all learned that lesson long ago. But the decision does more than
avoid the issue: it further confuses it. While allowing a person to
possess whatever trash he wants as long as he's alone, the Court
hasn't seen fit to let the guy buy the stuff and take it home. But
because old Stanley was sneaky, he came out smelling like a fourletter rose.
That the Stanley decision is not on all fours with the "Love Lust"
controversy, Professor Kanowitz is aware. Kanowitz is also an astute
legal realist, and his ability to get beneath the rationalizations of
court decisions is at times uncanny. It is apparent to anyone who has
read many of the Court's obscenity decisions that they are unusually
inconsistent and often self-contradictory. Unlike Kanowitz, though, I
don't think that the classroom obscenity problem can be solved by
piecing together various decisions or by trying to elicit a common
rationale. The criticism, though, is not addressed to Kanowitz, but
rather to the sloppiness of the Court.
The Court's basic failure, in my opinion, has been its reluctance to
talk about "obscene" matter solely within the context in which it
appears. It took a step in that direction in Stanley, but it was a short
and deceptive step. The Court could have said that old Stanley's
movies were not obscene as far as he was concerned (note that the
Court did concede that the movies didn't hurt him any), even though
they might have been termed obscene in the context of a Surprise
Preview at a local D.A.R. meeting. The same thing could be said
about the "Love Lust" controversy.
As the book reveals, "Love Lust" was not obscene to anyone who
remained in the class. Needless to say, the House of Representatives
is a different place. In New Mexico's case, the final irony is perhaps
revealed by the legislators' seeming lethargy the following Spring
when Lenore Kandel read "Love Lust" at the University's Popejoy
Hall-2,500 people jammed the place, and the reading ended with
thunderous applause and a standing ovation. How's that for poetic
justice?
At any rate, too much discussion of a comparatively short chapter
in Professor Kanowitz's book shouldn't be allowed to detract from
the book's personalized and dramatic account of the sordid and
lovely aspects of the whole affair. The book is excellently written,
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and in my opinion, its subject matter is a prime and appropriately
rank candidate for Hollywood. As a movie it would return a sizeable
profit, and by then, hopefully, old Stanley might be able to eat his
popcorn and buy it too.
I'm reminded of an earlier and remarkably similar uproar. When
Socrates was tried for corrupting the Athenian youth, his prime
accuser charged that the old goat had ridiculed the poets, who, at the
time, were regarded as the true source of wisdom. The validity of the
charge was questioned-as was the charge in the "Love Lust" controversy-and as one commentator said then, "there was hardly a
shred of legality to it."
Richard A. Simms*

*Law student at the University of New Mexico.

